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[liberationtech] Deconstructing the security risks narrative of Haystack

Andre Rebentisch arebentisch at
Fri Sep 17 15:11:49 PDT 2010

Am 17.09.2010 17:23, schrieb Collin Anderson:
> Inevitably there would have been flaws, and its absurd to think that the
> other side wasn't interested in finding them out.

I guess, you won't apply the K-principle by educating an enemy about
your vulnerabilities. It is a principle for your own considerations as a
design principle, an embracement of criticism. You accept the
information as if it was public knowledge and respond accordingly.

In terms of (partisan) warfare it is essential that you keep an enemy
unaware where and when you attack as to force him to allocate capacity;
ideally you let him chase phantoms. In a reverse perspective your own
"phantom" may be the belief in the competence and awareness of the
"other side".

What would be decoy scenarios for an application of privacy tools that
you know are not secure?

To add to the arguments from Sami Ben Gharbia consider the scenario that
no one in Persia actually uses the "ideological" tool. Then it still
conveys a strong domestic lobbying message: Privacy technology is useful
for domestic foreign policy objectives and values. Not difficult to
imagine the opposite narrative. Would a reasonable dissident select an
ideologically-branded product?

-- A

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