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[liberationtech] Belarus/Ericsson/GSM

Jochai Ben-Avie jochai at accessnow.org
Mon Jan 17 14:28:02 PST 2011


Not to take attention away from the really good conversation going on here
about mobile versions of Tor and other means of anonymizing/obfuscating the
identity and location of mobile devices, but I wanted to say a quick word
about lawful intercept and Nokia/Ericsson.



In comparing the actions of Ericsson to Nokia, I think it’s important to
draw a distinction between active and passive intercept. “Lawful Intercept”
is the “passive” backdoor that most, if not all, mobile phones (Nokia’s and
Ericsson’s included) have built in which allows law enforcement to tap
phones and otherwise monitor/intercept user communications.



As far as I can tell, from an EU perspective, there is no direct or indirect
legal obligation which would permit Nokia or Ericsson to argue that the
provision of interception capabilities was necessary under EU law. The only
exception to this is handover protocols, but that deals with data that have
already been intercepted, so is not a defense in itself for the provision of
interception capabilities. That said, the European standards institute ETSI
did adopt far-reaching standards several years ago regarding lawful
intercept, but a standard isn't the same as a legal obligation.



While it appears that Ericsson has only incorporated passive lawful
intercept technology in its phones, by way of contrast, Nokia Siemens
Networks also provides “active” interception capabilities, in the form of
its Monitoring Center, which allows the user (generally law enforcement) to
make use of the passive intercept capabilities in Nokia (and Ericsson)
phones. By its own admission, Nokia Siemens has sold at least 90 such
Monitoring Centers to over 60 countries including Iran. Nokia Siemens has
since sold its “Intelligence Solutions” business (which sold the Monitoring
Center) over to a new company called Trovicor, and claims that their only
involvement with the company is referring former customers. However, serious
questions remain about their ongoing relationship, the profits derived from
the sale of the unit, who Trovicor is doing business with, etc.



Hope this clarifies things a bit.



Cheers,

Jochai




-- 
Jochai Ben-Avie
Access Policy Analyst
jochai at accessnow.org
+1-888-414-0100 x704 (tel)
JochaiBen-Avie (skype)*
*

On Mon, Jan 17, 2011 at 4:50 PM, Yosem Companys <companys at stanford.edu>wrote:

> The technology liberation front has been talking about this topic on their
> blog today as well:
>
>  Why you should always encrypt your smartphone<http://techliberation.com/2011/01/17/why-you-should-always-encrypt-your-smartphone/>
>
> by RYAN RADIA <http://techliberation.com/author/ryan-radia/> on JANUARY
> 17, 2011 · ADD A COMMENT<http://techliberation.com/2011/01/17/why-you-should-always-encrypt-your-smartphone/#disqus_thread>
>
> The smartphone is arguably one of the most empowering and revolutionary
> technologies of the modern era. By putting the processing power of a
> personal computer<http://www.androidcentral.com/motorola-droid-bionic-quadrant-testing-shows-some-impressive-numbers> and
> the speed of a broadband connection<http://www.intomobile.com/2010/06/04/data-speed-showdown-sprint-4g-vs-t-mobile-hspa/> into
> a device that fits in a pocket, smartphones have revolutionized how we
> communicate<http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/6022762/the_smartphone_why_it_is_essential.html>
> , travel<http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2010-03-05-airphones05_CV_N.htm>
> , learn<http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/144/a-is-for-app.html?page=0%2C3>
> , game<http://www.kotaku.com.au/2010/11/going-mobile-the-smartphone-revolution/>
> , shop<http://unplugged.rcrwireless.com/index.php/20100709/news/1898/smartphones-change-the-way-we-shop/>,
> and more.<http://techliberation.com/2011/01/17/why-you-should-always-encrypt-your-smartphone/encryption/>
>
> Yet smartphones have an oft-overlooked downside: when they end up in the
> wrong hands, they offer overreaching agents of the state, thieves, hackers,
> and other wrongdoers an unparalleled avenue for uncovering and abusing the
> volumes of sensitive personal information we increasingly store on our
> mobile phones.
>
> Over on Ars Technica, I have a long feature story<http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/guides/2011/01/why-you-should-always-encrypt-your-smartphone.ars> that
> examines the constitutional and technical issues surrounding police searches
> of mobile phones:
>
> Last week, California’s Supreme Court reached a controversial 5-2 decision
> in *People v. Diaz <http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S166600.PDF>
> *(PDF) <http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S166600.PDF>*,*holding
> that police officers may lawfully search mobile phones found on arrested
> individuals’ persons without first obtaining a search warrant. The court
> reasoned that mobile phones, like cigarette packs and wallets, fall under
> the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution> to
> the Constitution. California’s opinion in *Diaz* is the latest of several
> recent court rulings<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1084503> upholding
> warrantless searches of mobile phones incident to arrest. While this
> precedent is troubling for civil liberties, it’s not a death knell for
> mobile phone privacy. If you follow a few basic guidelines, you can protect
> your mobile device from unreasonable search and seizure, even in the event
> of arrest. In this article, we will discuss the rationale for allowing
> police to conduct warrantless searches of arrestees, your right to remain
> silent during police interrogation, and the state of mobile phone security.
>
>
> On Mon, Jan 17, 2011 at 1:33 PM, Frank Corrigan <email at franciscorrigan.com
> > wrote:
>
>>
>> Three basic techniques can be used to determine the location of a cell
>> phone or other similar device:
>>    * GPS compares the timing of radio signals from satellites in space.
>>    * Triangulation collects directional signals from cell phone towers.
>>    * Wi-Fi local area networks track high-frequency radio signals from
>>    transmitters.
>> http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs2b-cellprivacy.htm#5
>> Via: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_phone_tracking
>>
>> ----- Original message -----
>> From: "Douglas Finley" <dafinley at gmail.com>
>> To: elhamucla at hotmail.com
>> Cc: "Frank Corrigan" <email at franciscorrigan.com>,
>> liberationtech-bounces at lists.stanford.edu,
>> liberationtech at mailman.stanford.edu
>> Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2011 14:52:08 -0600
>> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Belarus/Ericsson/GSM
>>
>> Well, I have a Nexus One purchased online running Android 2.2.
>> And I can connect to Wifi without my SIM card in. I was not able to run
>> Google Voice from the mobile App to make phone calls. Web works tho.
>> But what I did do was broadcast my Wifi signal ( I guess rebroadcast a
>> Wifi
>> signal).
>> I connected my laptop to that broadcasted signal from my phone...And I
>> was
>> able to use Google Voice from my laptop through the broadcasted
>> connection from my phone...that is picking up a WiFi connection without
>> a
>> SIM Card.
>>
>> Of course, why not just hook the laptop up directly to the same WiFi
>> your
>> phone is picking up, but I just wanted to test the limits.
>> I guess you have to trust that Wifi connection your phone is using.
>>
>> I know Frank said that you would still be tracked through base stations.
>> I
>> guess I see it being difficult without an actual SIM card.
>> I'm a programmer...I know nothing about hardware or networking so I
>> believe
>> you...but it seems a little difficult to do.
>> I guess the point is to get rid of the SIM card...and your left with a
>> mini
>> laptop that should be a little more secure than having
>> to keep track of multiple SIMs...that you actually have to connect to a
>> network immediately giving up your location and sensitive info.
>>
>> On Mon, Jan 17, 2011 at 2:32 PM, <elhamucla at hotmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> > From what I understand activists frequently change their sim card while
>> > keeping the same phone. But they worry that the phones might be
>> intercepted
>> > anyway.
>> > Sent on the Sprint® Now Network from my BlackBerry®
>> >
>> > -----Original Message-----
>> > From: "Frank Corrigan" <email at franciscorrigan.com>
>> > Sender: liberationtech-bounces at lists.stanford.edu
>> > Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2011 18:40:42
>> > To: <liberationtech at mailman.stanford.edu>
>> > Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Belarus/Ericsson/GSM
>> >
>> > Had a quick look at mobileactive.org, the issue of WiFi use is not
>> > covered (inc no SIM).
>> >
>> > I have done a quick web search on WiFi no SIM and can't find any sources
>> > I can quote, there in some discussion about hacks, but I have always
>> > found a phone will not access WiFi unless an activated SIM is inserted.
>> > If such a 'no SIM' hack did work then this still does not mean the
>> > phone's location could not be pinpointed, as the phone must be exchange
>> > unique identifiers for Wifi to function? But of course the phone would
>> > not have a registered/activated SIM.
>> >
>> > There is now a number of battery powered routers available, that can use
>> > SIM cards and or G3 Dongles and can be used to set up ad-hoc Open Wifi
>> > networks.
>> >
>> > Of course an adversary could still set up a cloned or Open Wifi network
>> > for "man in the middle attacks" and no doubt to locate specific users?
>> >
>> > Frank
>> >
>> > PS: These resources might be helpful, but are more orientated to
>> > combining computer use and internet access via WiFi / G3 Mobile
>> > broadband.
>> >
>> > Preconfigured privacy (circumvention) bundles for USB or LiveCD.
>> >    * Erinn synchronized the Windows, OS X, and Linux tor browser
>> >    bundles to use the same configurations and included software.
>> >    * The TAILS team continues to improve and update their LiveCD
>> >    available at https://amnesia.boum.org.
>> >    * Jacob began an audit of the TAILS LiveCD to help assess the safety
>> >    and security of the software for users in highly-volatile
>> >    situations.
>> > https://blog.torproject.org/blog/september-2010-progress-report
>> >
>> > The useful thing about using Tor on a LiveCD as a Bundle or with the
>> > integrated TAILS LiveCD, is that no trace of use is left on the host PC.
>> > (save for volatile RAM)
>> >
>> > There are broader possibilities with computers, such as using
>> > Truecrypt.org software. Though carrying round a mobile phone is far more
>> > ubiquitous.
>> >
>> >
>> > ----- Original message -----
>> > From: "Prabhas Pokharel" <prabhas.pokharel at gmail.com>
>> > To: "Douglas Finley" <dafinley at gmail.com>
>> > Cc: "Frank Corrigan" <email at franciscorrigan.com>,
>> > Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2011 19:21:04 +0100
>> > Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Belarus/Ericsson/GSM
>> >
>> > Douglas et al., this primer on mobile surveillance:
>> > http://mobileactive.org/howtos/mobile-surveillance-primer and other
>> > articles
>> > related to security on the site:
>> > http://www.mobileactive.org/tagging/mobile-security should be helpful,
>> > and
>> > answer some of these questions.
>> >
>> > The Guardian Project has a set of Android apps here:
>> > https://guardianproject.info/apps/ including instructions to set up a
>> > private encrypted VoIP network.
>> >
>> > Prabhas Pokharel
>> > http://twitter.com/prabhasp
>> > +1 347 948 7654 / +377 4567 3810 / skype: prabhasp
>> >
>> >
>> > On Mon, Jan 17, 2011 at 6:12 PM, Douglas Finley <dafinley at gmail.com>
>> > wrote:
>> >
>> > > Well I didn't know they already had mobile Tor's,
>> > > but would you still be able to be tracked through a phone number if
>> your
>> > > not using
>> > > your phone's SIM Card at all. Just WiFi, Tor, and Google Voice or
>> Skype
>> > >  but some VOIP service?
>> > > It seems like for Tor to work with any kind of mobile VOIP app it
>> would
>> > > have to be configured to
>> > > send its data through Tor.
>> > >
>> > > Tor only protects Internet applications that are configured to send
>> their
>> > > traffic through Tor — it doesn't magically anonymize all your traffic
>> > just
>> > > because you install it.
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > On Mon, Jan 17, 2011 at 11:01 AM, Frank Corrigan <
>> > > email at franciscorrigan.com> wrote:
>> > >
>> > >> Tor for Smartphones
>> > >> Android-based phones, tablets, computers Android Bundle Android
>> > >> Instructions
>> > >> iPhone, iPod Touch, iPad        Test packages by Marco
>> > >> Nokia Maemo/N900                Experimental instructions
>> > >> https://www.torproject.org/download/download.html.en
>> > >>
>> > >> Though use of Tor on a mobile phone/dongle will not stop tracing
>> > >> location via Cell Phone  IMEI (International Mobile Equipment
>> Identity)
>> > >> number/ SIM/Phone number Tower triangulation and ad-hoc mobile phone
>> > >> relay/interception towers being deployed by adversaries.
>> > >>
>> > >> Olympics bosses probe mobile tracking tech
>> > >> http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/07/06/olympics_mobile_tracking/
>> > >>
>> > >> Frank
>> > >>
>> > >> ----- Original message -----
>> > >> From: "Douglas Finley" <dafinley at gmail.com>
>> > >> To: "elham gheytanchi" <elhamucla at hotmail.com>
>> > >> Cc: liberationtech at mailman.stanford.edu
>> > >> Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2011 10:41:26 -0600
>> > >> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Belarus/Ericsson/GSM
>> > >>
>> > >> Conceptually,
>> > >>
>> > >> Does anyone know how effective a mobile version of Tor would be?
>> > >> Same server/client relationship strictly related to WiFi.
>> > >> I know using the service over 3G would be futile, but if your phone
>> had
>> > >> a
>> > >> mobile Tor app..you would be able to talk/text/web on your mobile
>> more
>> > >> securely right?
>> > >> Does anyone know if Mobile languages (iOS, Android, etc) give you API
>> > >> access
>> > >> to what you need to make something like that work?
>> > >>
>> > >> On Mon, Jan 17, 2011 at 10:10 AM, elham gheytanchi
>> > >> <elhamucla at hotmail.com>wrote:
>> > >>
>> > >> >  when I was in Iran two years ago, I met up with three activists
>> > >> (women's
>> > >> > rights activists) and none of them brought their cell phones to our
>> > >> meeting
>> > >> > place. when I asked them why: they said they have learned- by trial
>> > and
>> > >> > error- that it is best to turn off their cell phones, take the sim
>> > card
>> > >> > out and leave it at home because otherwise they are traced by the
>> > >> security
>> > >> > forces.
>> > >> >
>> > >> > Best,
>> > >> > elham
>> > >> >
>> > >> > > From: cfarivar at cfarivar.org
>> > >> > > Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2011 15:54:22 +0100
>> > >> > > To: AllnuttL at rferl.org
>> > >> > > CC: liberationtech at mailman.stanford.edu
>> > >> > > Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Belarus/Ericsson/GSM
>> > >> >
>> > >> > >
>> > >> > > For what it's worth, Nokia Siemens Networks basically said the
>> same
>> > >> > > thing about the kit they sold to Iran pre 2009 election.
>> > >> > >
>> > >> > > -C
>> > >> > >
>> > >> > > On Fri, Jan 14, 2011 at 2:41 PM, Luke Allnutt <
>> AllnuttL at rferl.org>
>> > >> > wrote:
>> > >> > > >
>> > >> > > > Dear All,
>> > >> > > >
>> > >> > > > I'm a journalist from RFE/RL working on a story about the
>> recent
>> > >> > crackdown
>> > >> > > > in Belarus. Our Belarus Service is reporting that hundreds of
>> cell
>> > >> > phone
>> > >> > > > owners are being summoned for interrogation by police and the
>> KGB
>> > >> > because,
>> > >> > > > on December 19, they were using their phones at the site of the
>> > >> > > > antigovernment protest.
>> > >> > > >
>> > >> > > > We are trying to ascertain whether the phone operators were
>> asked
>> > to
>> > >> > supply
>> > >> > > > the information about their customers' phone calls or whether
>> the
>> > >> KGB
>> > >> > was
>> > >> > > > able to track these calls on their own. Both scenarios seem
>> > >> plausible.
>> > >> > > >
>> > >> > > > If anyone has any insight into what might have happened here
>> and
>> > how
>> > >> > easy it
>> > >> > > > would be for the KGB to get that location data on their own, it
>> > >> would
>> > >> > be
>> > >> > > > much appreciated.
>> > >> > > >
>> > >> > > > My second question, if I may, would be about Ericsson, who have
>> > >> > supplied
>> > >> > > > Belarus operators with GSM equipment. I spoke via email to
>> > Ericsson,
>> > >> > and
>> > >> > > > from what I can make out, the GSM equipment they've supplied
>> > Belarus
>> > >> > with is
>> > >> > > > pretty standard and contains capabilities for "lawful
>> intercept,"
>> > >> which
>> > >> > they
>> > >> > > > say is entirely in keeping with worldwide standards and norms.
>> > >> > > >
>> > >> > > > I've spoken to a few experts to try to ascertain whether
>> Ericsson
>> > is
>> > >> > doing
>> > >> > > > anything inappropriate here. Should they, for instance, sell
>> > >> different
>> > >> > > > equipment to countries with less-than-democratic records? How
>> > >> difficult
>> > >> > > > would it be for Ericsson to reengineer their systems so lawful
>> > >> > intercept
>> > >> > > > capabilities were taken out? And how difficult would it be to
>> put
>> > >> those
>> > >> > > > things back in?
>> > >> > > >
>> > >> > > > I apologize if these questions seem overly simplistic or
>> > >> off-the-mark.
>> > >> > I
>> > >> > > > have only a fairly limited understanding of the engineering
>> > >> questions;
>> > >> > thus
>> > >> > > > why I'm turning to you people.
>> > >> > > >
>> > >> > > > If anyone would have the time to answer my questions on list or
>> > off
>> > >> > list, I
>> > >> > > > would be hugely grateful. Many thanks for your time.
>> > >> > > >
>> > >> > > > Best Wishes,
>> > >> > > >
>> > >> > > > Luke
>> > >> > > >
>> > >> > > > _______________________________________________
>> > >> > > > liberationtech mailing list
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>> > >> > >
>> > >> > >
>> > >> > >
>> > >> > > --
>> > >> > > ----------------------------------------
>> > >> > > Cyrus Farivar
>> > >> > > "suh-ROOS FAR-ih-var"
>> > >> > >
>> > >> > >  Freelance Technology Journalist
>> > >> > > cfarivar at cfarivar.org
>> > >> > >
>> > >> > > DE: +49 163 763 3108 (m)
>> > >> > > US: +1 510 394 5485 (m)
>> > >> > >
>> > >> > > AIM: FarivarCJ
>> > >> > > Twitter/Skype/Yahoo/gChat: cfarivar
>> > >> > >
>> > >> > > http://www.cyrusfarivar.com
>> > >> > >
>> > >> > > "Being a good writer is 3% talent, 97% not being distracted by
>> the
>> > >> > Internet."
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