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[liberationtech] Cryptocat Censored in China
holz at net.in.tum.de
Sun Dec 23 04:00:56 PST 2012
Sorry for the continous update.
But while GreatFire reports our site as 100% blocked, I have no
difficulty accessing it from my host in Shanghai. So, that's why I'd
love to hear more about how you conduct your measurements.
BTW - the same site is listed as 0% blocked when accessed via HTTP.
Maybe we are really dealing with a measurement artefact in combination
with SSL handshakes going through other border routers here?
On 12/23/2012 12:57 PM, Ralph Holz wrote:
> FWIW, our PKI site with our measurements and data sets gets reported as
> "100% blocked" by GreatFire. ;) I wonder how I should interpret that. ;)
> On 12/23/2012 04:28 AM, Martin Johnson wrote:
>> Hi all,
>> I'm the founder of GreatFire.org. Let me try to explain how we run our
>> tests. I'd very much like to get your feedback on how our system can
>> become more accurate and transparent.
>> The two Crypto.cat URLs being tested can be viewed here:
>> Both pages state that the URLs are "x% restricted in China" but "0%
>> blocked". Next to the "Otherwise restricted" label, there's a link to
>> "Throttling" explaining our definition which in turn refers
>> to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bandwidth_throttling. A throttled
>> websites is slow but not blocked. Labeling it as throttled also suggests
>> that it's intentionally slow, which we cannot prove. A lot of foreign
>> websites are slow in China, but there are big differences. For example,
>> we strongly suspect that GMail and other Google services are actively
>> throttled, to discourage people from using them. Other websites could
>> simply be slow because of where they are hosted and the speed from China
>> to that web host.
>> On our test pages, if you click on any date in the calendar, you can
>> view our detailed test data. You can for example see that the "Host IPs"
>> for Crypto.cat returned when tested from the US and different locations
>> in China are the same. You can also verify the HTML title and the
>> download size, etc.
>> Crypto.cat is not blocked in China now, but if it becomes popular, it
>> will most likely be blocked. If they use DNS poisoning you'd have to
>> setup mirror websites. If they block the IP, however, you can rotate the
>> IP addresses to get around it. We offer a service that does this
>> at https://unblock.cn.com and we'd be happy to help you reach as many
>> users as possible in China.
>> Feedback very welcome.
>> Martin Johnson
>> https://FreeWeibo.com <https://freeweibo.com/> - Uncensored, Anonymous
>> Sina Weibo Search.
>> https://GreatFire.org <https://greatfire.org/> - Monitoring Online
>> Censorship In China.
>> https://Unblock.cn.com <https://unblock.cn.com/> - We Can Unblock Your
>> Website In China.
>> On Sun, Dec 23, 2012 at 1:04 AM, Joss Wright
>> <joss-liberationtech at pseudonymity.net
>> <mailto:joss-liberationtech at pseudonymity.net>> wrote:
>> On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 05:48:34PM +0100, Ralph Holz wrote:
>> > PS: While I was at it, I checked the current DNS rewriting for
>> > twitter.com <http://twitter.com>. It still points to a Korean IP.
>> Some of the more fun DNS poisoning in my experiments were >=15
>> apparently unrelated servers across China all redirecting
>> torproject.org <http://torproject.org>
>> to 'tonycastro.net <http://tonycastro.net>' or 'tonycastro.com
>> <http://tonycastro.com>', and a separate set redirecting
>> to 'thepetclubfl.net <http://thepetclubfl.net>'.
>> A New Scientist journalist wrote up that work and contacted both
>> sites. Tony Castro instantly threatened to sue everyone in sight for
>> implying that he was a Chinese sleeper agent. The Pet Club webmaster had
>> noticed the Chinese traffic and was interested to know where it had come
>> from. :) (I suggested setting up a few China-focused pay-per-view
>> (Requires registration.)
>>  http://tonycastro.net/ (A life story worth Googling...)
>> Joss Wright | @JossWright
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