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[liberationtech] Help users in Iran reach the internet
sina.rabbani at gmail.com
Wed Feb 15 08:43:36 PST 2012
yor are correct. SSL in back in iran.
On Feb 15, 2012 3:05 AM, "Walid AL-SAQAF <alkasir admin>" <
admin at alkasir.com> wrote:
> Hi all,
> Just thought I'd let you knwo that I got updates from Alkasir users in
> Iran saying that SSL access has resumed and Tor, Alkasir and other
> circumvention solutions are working. Please let me know if that is in fact
> not the case.
> Walid Al-Saqaf
> Founder & Administrator
> alkasir for mapping and circumventing cyber censorship
> https://alkasir.com <walid.al-saqaf at oru.se>
> On Fri, Feb 10, 2012 at 12:45 PM, Jacob Appelbaum <jacob at appelbaum.net>wrote:
>> Hi Libtech,
>> I just wrote this email to the Tor-talk list and I think it's important
>> for this list to see this ASAP:
>> Here's my original email as a page:
>> Here's the original email for discussion:
>> In the last 48 hours a major campaign of filtering has started in Iran -
>> it started slow and now appears to be that nearly all SSL/TLS traffic is
>> blocked on a few major Iranian ISPs. Details are rather rough but we're
>> working on some solutions - we've long had an ace up our sleeves for
>> this exact moment in the arms race but it's perhaps come while the User
>> Interface edges are a bit rough still.
>> Here's the deal - we need people to run Tor bridges but a special kind
>> of Tor bridge, one that does a kind of traffic camouflaging - we call it
>> an obfuscated bridge. It's not easy to set up just yet because we were
>> not ready to deploy this for everyone yet; it lacks a lot of analysis
>> and it might even only last for a few days at the rate the arms race is
>> progressing, if you could call it progress.
>> There are highly technical instructions here:
>> Currently if you run such a bridge, you'll either need to manually tell
>> us (via email to tor-assistants at torproject.org ) about it or you'll need
>> to share these bridges with people you want to help directly. It's a
>> pain and we're working on it.
>> Here's a bug report where we're working around the clock to get stuff
>> going in a user friendly manner:
>> This kind of help is not for the technically faint of heart but it's
>> absolutely needed for people in Iran, right now. It's likely that more
>> than ~50,000 - ~60,000 Tor users may drop offline.
>> Watch this graph for an idea of the censorship impact of directly
>> connecting Tor users:
>> Here's the same graph but for Tor bridge users in Iran:
>> We're working on easy to use client software and if you're in Iran or
>> need one desperately, please email help at rt.torproject.org. We'll try to
>> get you a working obfsproxy bridge address and working client software.
>> All the best,
>> liberationtech mailing list
>> liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu
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