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[liberationtech] issilentcircleopensourceyet.com

Ali-Reza Anghaie ali at packetknife.com
Tue Nov 6 11:00:42 PST 2012


Trust isn't a simple matter of FOSS or not. It just isn't - you know that
as well. The code isn't often the biggest limiting factor although the code
availability provides a degree of mobility not otherwise available.
Additionally
~availability~ and ~usability~ matter too. The standoff position from the
outset doesn't exactly endear anybody to anybody here (you to them, them to
you).

We're not disagreeing ont he ultimate goals - at all I don't believe. I'm
disagreeing on the tactical approaches to get us to the strategic vision of
people expecting and using, carriers understanding and allowing, and
Governments simply not interfering.

I can already hear echoes of mailing lists threads past coming back.

I'll stand down, the back and forth is already echoing in my head. I'll
continue to deal with the reality on the ground for the "have nots" - and
you keep up the good fight in your corner of the World as well. Be well,
Cheers, -Ali



On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 1:53 PM, Nadim Kobeissi <nadim at nadim.cc> wrote:

> Ali,
> The issue is trust. Security software verifiability should not have to
> depend on Silent Circle (or who they hire to audit, for example Veracode.)
>
>
> NK
>
>
>
> On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 1:51 PM, Ali-Reza Anghaie <ali at packetknife.com>wrote:
>
>> Nobody would dispute that - that's not quite the same thing as FOSS
>> default positions or some of the other criticisms.
>>
>>  For example, I'd contend a paid Veracode audit would in all likelihood
>> be better than any typical FOSS audit. Had they done that (heck, they might
>> have but I doubt it) and still announced the intent of opening the codebase
>> - I wager that would not have stopped the criticism.
>>
>> It appears to be a deep-seeded cultural divide more than any of the other
>> factors combined.
>>
>> -Al
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 1:43 PM, Yosem Companys <companys at stanford.edu>wrote:
>>
>>> Security audits are always important, especially when people's lives are
>>> at risk.
>>>
>>> On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 10:37 AM, Nadim Kobeissi <nadim at nadim.cc> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi Ali,
>>>> There is no "agenda," and there needn't be one if you are to critique
>>>> security software. No need to be so aggressive.
>>>> My qualms against Silent Circle are detailed here:
>>>> http://log.nadim.cc/?p=89
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> NK
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 1:34 PM, Ali-Reza Anghaie <ali at packetknife.com>wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Seriously - what's your agenda?
>>>>>
>>>>> Where are the domains for the other tens of providers who charge arms
>>>>> and legs based on closed protocols even?
>>>>>
>>>>> What's the nit with Silent Circle specifically? Because they're
>>>>> accessible? Because it's easier to use? Because the founders have good
>>>>> track records of standing up to Government too?
>>>>>
>>>>> Being absolutist about everything isn't helping anyone who ~needs~ it
>>>>> - it's a privilege of the "haves" that we can have these conversations over
>>>>> and over again.
>>>>>
>>>>> Shouldn't we have taken the "fight" to carriers, Apple iOS T&Cs, etc.
>>>>> harder and longer ago? And why do we keep expecting private entities to
>>>>> fight our Government battles for us? It's a losing proposition and
>>>>> increases the costs-per-individual to untenable levels when we mix
>>>>> absolutely all their enterprise with civil liberty issues.
>>>>>
>>>>> There has got to be a better way than this ridiculous trolling and
>>>>> bickering. Someone? Anyone?
>>>>>
>>>>> Again, seriously, what's the agenda against Silent Circle specifically?
>>>>>
>>>>> -Ali
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 1:20 PM, Nadim Kobeissi <nadim at nadim.cc> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> http://issilentcircleopensourceyet.com/
>>>>>>
>>>>>> NK
>>>>>>
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>>>>>
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