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[liberationtech] Designing the best network infrastructure for a Human Rights NGO
anonymous2013 at nym.hush.com
anonymous2013 at nym.hush.com
Thu Feb 28 06:21:03 PST 2013
Agreed, this kind of advice is what I was hoping to get on LibTech!
On Thu, 28 Feb 2013 14:16:56 +0000 cantona7 at hushmail.com wrote:
>Thanks excellent advice - much to think about.
>On Thu, 28 Feb 2013 14:09:39 +0000 "Tom Ritter" <tom at ritter.vg>
>>On 28 February 2013 07:39, <anonymous2013 at nym.hush.com> wrote:
>>> We are a human rights NGO that is looking to invest in the best
>>> possible level of network security (protection from high-level
>>> cyber-security threats, changing circumvention/proxy to protect
>>> address etc, encryption on endpoints and server, IDS/Physical
>>> Software Firewall/File Integrity Monitoring, Mobile Device
>>> Management, Honeypots) we can get for a our internal network. I
>>> wondering if people would critique the following network, add
>>> comments, suggestions and alternative methods/pieces of
>>> (Perhaps if it goes well we could make a short paper out of it,
>>> others to use.)
>>> -Windows 2012 Server
>>> -VMWare virtual machines running Win 8 for remote access
>>Windows doesn't scare me, full remote access scares me. (I'm
>>at how many people are saying "X is insecure" with no
>>or why an alternative is more secure.) Obviously you'll need
>>for remote workers, but see the next section...
>>> -Industry standard hardening and lock down of all OS systems.
>>Industry 'Standard' hardening isn't particularly good because
>>'Standard' is 'Standard' and 'Standard' is also hacked over and
>>again. Upgrading your RDP authentication level is a good idea
>>'Standard' - but what you want most of all is separation of
>> I don't mean "Bob the sysadmin is the only person who can
>>the mailserver" I mean "Bob the sysadmin is the only person who
>>administer the mailserver, and he can only do it from a separate
>>computer that's on a separate airgapped network and he doesn't
>>Airgapping brings thoughts of crazy military-levels of paranoia -
>>it's not all that difficult and it's getting more and more
>>Get a couple cheapish laptops, a separate consumer-level
>>connection, and run red cables plus blue to a few people's desks.
>>Think about it terms of compartmentalisation, both airgapped and
>>out your network, and then fill an entire section with Red -
>>what the attacker controls. How does he move to another section?
>>data does he get? Brainstorm this part heavily, consider putting
>>up on a permanent whiteboard and referring to it every time
>>comes in and needs access to X group's fileserver, or what-have-
>>> -Constantly changing proxies
>>I have no idea what you intend to accomplish with this.
>>*more* logging of your employees, or not disabling WPAD sounds
>>the opposite of what you'd want. (And a note on the WPAD item:
>>disable IPv6 too.)
>>> -Sophos Enterprise Protection, Encryption and Patch management
>>> -Sophos mobile management
>>Uh, I guess. I guess I shouldn't disparage something I've never
>>reviewed and haven't worked with... But my opinion of "Enterprise
>>Protection" products isn't too high until I've seen an
>>security firm see how secure the product is and how much it
>>surface it adds.
>>> -Encrypted voice calls for mobile and a more secure alternative
>>> Skype via Silent Circle.
>>So I guess that's RedPhone?
>>> -TrueCrypt on all drives - set to close without use after a
>>> specific time
>>Bitlocker is a fine alternative, and probably easier to
>>via Group Policy.
>>> -False and poison pill files
>>Ooookay. This isn't a bad idea, but it's pretty damn complicated
>>set up - you're moving more and more towards something that
>>24/7 SOC (Security Operations Center) and further away from
>>"Architecting a secure network."
>>> -Snort IDS
>>And someone full time (or 2 people, really probably a team of
>>operating 24/7) to monitor these? Cause this stuff doesn't help
>>if no one's looking at it.
>>> -Easily controlled kill commands
>>> -No wifi
>>Good luck with that. I guess no one's going to have any
>>meetings or use any MacBook airs, tablets, or phones for work
>>purposes. (Unlikely.) Having everyone use the cell towers isn't
>>great idea either. This sounds like you haven't done a
>>gathering phase with your users.
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