Search Mailing List Archives


Limit search to: Subject & Body Subject Author
Sort by: Reverse Sort
Limit to: All This Week Last Week This Month Last Month
Select Date Range     through    

[liberationtech] Skype Open Letter: CALL FOR SIGNATORIES

Petter Ericson pettter at acc.umu.se
Fri Jan 18 12:31:21 PST 2013


Hi!

Good work :)

First: some nitpicking: third-parties in the second paragraph should
probably lose the hyphen.

Second: I would be very happy to see a Telecomix signature on this
letter :)

Best regards

/P

On 18 January, 2013 - Nadim Kobeissi wrote:

> Okay everyone,
> the *final draft* has been posted online, with the gracious collaboration
> of the EFF. Please take a look at it, make sure you want to keep your
> signature there (or add it!)
> 
> http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/
> 
> We'll be publishing next week.
> 
> 
> NK
> 
> 
> On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 4:29 AM, Grégoire Pouget <gregoire at rsf.org> wrote:
> 
> >  We'd like to see the final / rewritten version of the letter first but Reporters
> > Without Borders <http://rsf.org> would be happy to sign it.
> >
> > Best,
> >
> >
> > Le 17/01/2013 08:01, Nadim Kobeissi a écrit :
> >
> > Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process of
> > reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take what you
> > said into consideration.
> >
> >
> > NK
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian <chris at soghoian.net>wrote:
> >
> >> You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government
> >> surveillance section:
> >>
> >> As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may
> >> now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered
> >> in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider,
> >> Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of
> >> National Security Letters.
> >>
> >>
> >>  You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the people
> >> signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have access to
> >> real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so, say that,
> >> and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it doesn't
> >> specify under what situations the government can perform an interception,
> >>
> >>  Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance
> >> practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require
> >> a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I
> >> would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law
> >> does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons,
> >> and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without
> >> even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US
> >> persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702
> >>
> >>  Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 ("FAA"), codified as 50
> >> U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of
> >> National Intelligence ("DNI") to authorize jointly the targeting of
> >> non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a
> >> period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains
> >> restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance "may not
> >> intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be
> >> located in the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney
> >> General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order ("mass
> >> acquisition order") for the surveillance either before their joint
> >> authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by
> >> which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for
> >> their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is
> >> designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United
> >> States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify
> >> targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized
> >> probable cause determinations or supervise the program.
> >> (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/)
> >>
> >>
> >>  While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to sign
> >> on to this letter on behalf of the ACLU.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>  On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi <nadim at nadim.cc> wrote:
> >>
> >>>  Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists,
> >>>
> >>>  I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to
> >>> Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as signatories:
> >>>
> >>>  http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/
> >>>
> >>>  The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome.
> >>>
> >>>  Thank you,
> >>>  NK
> >>>
> >>>  --
> >>> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at:
> >>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at:
> >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> >>
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> >
> >
> > --
> > Grégoire Pouget,
> > New Media Desk // Bureau Nouveaux Médias
> > Reporters Without Borders // Reporters sans frontières
> > @fightcensors_en @fightcensors_fr
> > GPG ID : 2BBC1ECE
> >
> >
> > --
> > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at:
> > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
> >

> --
> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

-- 
Petter Ericson (pettter at acc.umu.se)
Telecomix Sleeper Jellyfish



More information about the liberationtech mailing list