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[liberationtech] Crowd steps up to fund 'NSA-proof' app

Axel Simon axelsimon at axelsimon.net
Fri Jul 12 04:03:55 PDT 2013


 

2013-07-12 08:54, Brian Conley: 

> +1 
> On Jul 11, 2013 11:48 PM,
"Douglas Lucas" <dal at riseup.net [2]> wrote:
> 
>> I can't wait until
S̶i̶l̶e̶n̶t̶ ̶C̶i̶r̶c̶l̶e̶ Heml.is is open source!
>> 
>> On 07/12/2013
01:29 AM, phryk wrote:
>> > On Thu, 11 Jul 2013 23:09:04 -0700
>> >
Brian Conley <brianc at smallworldnews.tv [1]> wrote:
>> >
>> >> If it's
not open source we aren't trusting it, so wait and see.
>> >
>> > My
thought exactly. The companies involved in PRISM denied giving the
>> >
feds access to their data, so why won't some guys I've never even
heard
>> > of before not do the same?
>> >
>> > […]
> 
>>> 
>>> The
Aljazeera post also hails it as "the first secure mobile messaging
>> >
system.". Did I miss something there? What about XMPP+OTR? What about
>>
> Whispers' TextSecure?

Another simple question is: how many of these
"secure apps" do we need? 

I understand the need for diversity, really,
but when we already have a bunch of different solutions (TextSecure,
XMPP+OTR, mail+PGP), can't we build on something pre-existing rather
than start from scratch everytime? Doesn't that add a risk of baking
more homemade crypto and all the possible errors that come with that?


It's obviously a hard line to tread between diversity and
fragmentation, but it feels like more apps are being announced every
other week. 

The situation gives me this feeling that this is the
moment to sell your new super-privacy-enhanced app now the market is
sensitive to the argument and everyone is coming out of the woods to do
so. 

Or maybe I'm just a bit cynical today. 

 axel 

> 




Links:
------
[1] mailto:brianc at smallworldnews.tv
[2]
mailto:dal at riseup.net
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