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[liberationtech] Cell phone tracking

Pavol Luptak wilder at trip.sk
Sat Jun 8 03:50:27 PDT 2013


Some information yoy may consider to be interesting:

1. It is possible to buy completely anonymous SIM cards (with data roaming that
works everywhere in Europe including the UK) in Czech Republic. For 1.2 GB
roaming data it costs about 800 Kc (31 €) monthly. I've already activated it 
for some of my friends who travelled around Europe and wanted to access to the 
Internet anonymously. 

2. It should be possible to change IMEI on the fly (regardless the fact that
this is illegal in most countries), I found this "STEALTH-PHONE" that should 
be able to do it:

http://www.endoacustica.com/details_stealth_phone_en.htm

The Stealth Phone is able to change IMEI code in different ways: systematically
or manually, using simple procedures.

Do you have any experiences with that?

3. There are many ways how to pay for mobile/Internet connection anonymously
(e.g. https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Contracts#Example_7:_Rapidly-adjusted_.28micro.29payments_to_a_pre-determined_party)

There is an evil plan that is probably viable:

1. Come to your 'favourite' parliament with IMSI/IMEI catcher and make
a nice list of IMEIs of your 'favourite' politicians.

2. Buy multiple anonymous SIM cards (multiple IMSI).

3. Buy STEALTH-PHONE capable to change IMEI on-the-fly

4. In your STEALTH-PHONE enumerate IMEI frequently of each politician's phone
+ change frequently your anonymous SIM cards

5. Be free & stealthy :-)

Regarding two (or more) same IMEI of enabled phones - in one network this can
caused a collision - one of them can be blacklisted (the question is if it
was your clone or the original:) 
In the worst case, this can be a nice phone DoS against the system :)

But according to this:
http://forum.gsmhosting.com/vbb/f131/what-will-happen-if-two-phones-same-imei-run-same-network-3965/

it should work:

I test it on two T10 in the same network & same room . We can speak with one
fone with the other fine.

but probably these checks depends on the mobile provider.

BTW, if you are attending OHM2013 in Netherlands this year, Karsten Nohl will
have there a presentation:

    SIM card exploitation – by [2]Karsten Nohl

   The protection pretense of SIM cards is based on the understanding that
   they have never been exploited. This talk ends this myth of unbreakable
   SIM cards and illustrates that the cards –like any other computing
   system– are plagued by implementation and configuration bugs.

Pavol

On Mon, Jun 03, 2013 at 09:16:54AM -0400, Rich Kulawiec wrote:
> On Sun, Jun 02, 2013 at 10:16:20PM -0400, Nathan of Guardian wrote:
> > In summary, if the focused threat you need to address is location
> > tracking by carriers/operators, and you live in an area with a decent
> > saturation of "open" wifi hotspots, I feel there is something you can do
> > about it. Now your adversaries have to work a bit harder (tracking IPs
> > to hotspots, physical surveillance, etc) to build a geo map of your
> > comings and goings.
> 
> In re this topic, please see this paper:
> 
> 	Unique in the Crowd: The privacy bounds of human mobility
> 	http://www.nature.com/srep/2013/130325/srep01376/full/srep01376.html
> 
> Abstract:
> 
> 	We study fifteen months of human mobility data for one and a half
> 	million individuals and find that human mobility traces are highly
> 	unique. In fact, in a dataset where the location of an individual
> 	is specified hourly, and with a spatial resolution equal to that
> 	given by the carrier's antennas, four spatio-temporal points are
> 	enough to uniquely identify 95% of the individuals. We coarsen
> 	the data spatially and temporally to find a formula for the
> 	uniqueness of human mobility traces given their resolution and
> 	the available outside information. This formula shows that the
> 	uniqueness of mobility traces decays approximately as the 1/10
> 	power of their resolution. Hence, even coarse datasets provide
> 	little anonymity. These findings represent fundamental constraints
> 	to an individual's privacy and have important implications for
> 	the design of frameworks and institutions dedicated to protect
> 	the privacy of individuals.
> 
> And remember Schneier's maxim: attacks always get better.  So the work
> which these researchers have done (and it appears to me to be fine work)
> will be extended, refined, improved.
> 
> ---rsk
> --
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-- 
_______________________________________________________________
[wilder at trip.sk] [http://trip.sk/wilder/] [talker: ttt.sk 5678]


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