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[liberationtech] to encrypt or not to encrypt?
Bruce Potter at IRF
bpotter at irf.org
Sat Jun 22 12:07:51 PDT 2013
That and get everyone to salt every message with a random assortment of words and phrases from "flag lists"
On Jun 21, 2013, at 11:55 AM, Nadim Kobeissi <nadim at nadim.cc> wrote:
> The solution to this is to make encryption more and more widely used. By increasing the number of people with access to encryption technology for their communications, we dilute this threat.
> On 2013-06-21, at 11:52 AM, Michael Rogers <michael at briarproject.org> wrote:
>> Signed PGP part
>> It's unfortunate that Ars Technica has chosen that angle, since I
>> believe it misrepresents the situation: if you use encryption, the NSA
>> may indeed retain your encrypted traffic, but won't be able to read
>> it. If you don't use encryption, the NSA will be able to read your
>> traffic, and will retain it if it contains anything interesting, or if
>> you're not an American. So encryption is still a net gain for privacy.
>> Blending in is a red herring in my opinion - metadata (which isn't
>> subject to the restrictions discussed in the Ars Technica article)
>> reveals who talks to whom and when. That's sufficient to identify
>> persons of interest, regardless of whether they use encryption. Any
>> activist or journalist should assume they're already a person of
>> interest, thanks to their job and the people they talk to. Not to be
>> subject to surveillance would be something of a professional
>> embarrassment. ;-) So forget about blending in. Assume you're subject
>> to surveillance, and think about what steps you're going to take in
>> On 21/06/13 16:41, dan mcquillan wrote:
>>> a few people who came to our university cryptoparty asked whether
>>> they're just going to draw attention to themselves by encrypting
>>> the latest leaks seems to give a firm 'yes', as the NSA
>>> specifically keeps encrypted comms indefinitely.
>>> sample news item:
>>> how would list members answer the question 'to encrypt or not to
>>> cheers dan
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