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[liberationtech] a privacy preserving and resilient social network

Matt Johnson railmeat at gmail.com
Fri Jun 28 22:18:21 PDT 2013


" Encryption meaningfully prevented a wiretap
for the first time ever in *2012* (or so we're told, for
non-intelligence domestic US wiretaps), and has only ever worked five
times."

What are you referring to? Do you have a pointer to more information?
I am very curious.

--
Matt Johnson



On Fri, Jun 28, 2013 at 10:13 PM, Eleanor Saitta <ella at dymaxion.org> wrote:
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> On 2013.06.28 13.14, Jonathan Wilkes wrote:
>> Just curious, Eleanor-- once you implement your "bullet-proof"
>> privacy- preserving network, how do you plan to make the user
>> experience at all tolerable without automated mirroring like what
>> this developer has written and tested?
>
> That's going to depend on the system and the situation.  With Briar,
> we do things that are fairly similar, but we also make a point of
> taking unlinkability seriously.  Research code into social mirroring?
>  Awesome.  Protocol design intended for deployment that ignores
> unlinkability?  Not awesome.
>
> More specifically, some of this is unrelated to Alireza's proposal --
> I'm using it to illustrate the kinds of shifts that we need to
> undertake in our thinking here.  It's not about *this* tool, it's
> about every tool we build.  To that end, I suppose I do owe them a bit
> of an apology -- really, it's nothing personal about this tool (and
> certainly not anything about them, although I hope that's obvious).
> It's all of us and everything that needs to shift.
>
> Finally, I should note in passing, I'm not trying to make something
> "bullet-proof".  I care about security outcomes, not security
> theories.  What I want to see is our tools reaching the point where
> we're actually playing the game, because right now, we're not even on
> the road to the stadium.  Encryption meaningfully prevented a wiretap
> for the first time ever in *2012* (or so we're told, for
> non-intelligence domestic US wiretaps), and has only ever worked five
> times.  This is pathetic and terrifying.  Let's become an actual problem.
>
> E.
>
> - --
> Ideas are my favorite toys.
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> --
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