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[liberationtech] US wiretap statistics (was re: a privacy preserving and resilient social network)

Alireza Mahdian alireza.mahdian at gmail.com
Fri Jun 28 22:52:22 PDT 2013


I really hope all your other facts are not based on this link you sent. as Matt rightfully put it we don't know the kind of cipher that was used it could have been a  very primitive one. you are making a very bold statement based on a very incomplete data. it is as if you are claiming that if one cipher can be broken all the other ciphers are breakable as well (theoretically speaking all ciphers are breakable given unlimited amount of time). As for all your previous comments it just suffices to say that you will understand a lot more about my proposal if you read my thesis in entirety. 

As for your recommended approach of not releasing research softwares to regular users you have to know that MANY of the current technologies that are being used have their roots in research projects. You mention Tor and so many other applications and ALL of them have started as a research project in academia. My claim is that MyZone is privacy preserving and I stand by it. I never claimed that it is providing anonymity and in fact I have pointed out that it does not even aim for it. As the creator of MyZone I did not felt the need for unlinkability as deniability is provided to a needed degree. You probably are not going to give my app even a try but I would certainly give your "Bullet proof" solution if it ever sees the light of the day a try and read its documentation in full before criticizing it. I have tried SO MANY of these solutions that you mentioned in a very restrictive environment (I come from Iran and I have first hand experience on whatever you are mentioning here) and trust me they are often so slow (you have to consider dial up bandwidth) that you prefer to avoid them in the first place. I will consider any "constructive" criticism of my work and appreciate it very much but telling me that I have solved the "wrong" problem is just your opinion. I certainly wouldn't consider my self such expert enough in the field to make a blunt statement like that towards anybody's work. I will not respond to any of your comments from this point on until I see reasonable signs that you have read my thesis and at the very least understand my design choices. I owe you a thank you for the time you have put to write those emails regarding my work. 

On Jun 28, 2013, at 11:28 PM, Matt Johnson <railmeat at gmail.com> wrote:

> Well that is good news, thanks for the pointer!
> 
> Now all we need is for the court to report what cipher and which
> encryption tools were used...
> 
> --
> Matt Johnson
> 
> 
> 
> On Fri, Jun 28, 2013 at 10:21 PM, Eleanor Saitta <ella at dymaxion.org> wrote:
>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>> Hash: SHA256
>> 
>> On 2013.06.29 01.18, Matt Johnson wrote:
>>> " Encryption meaningfully prevented a wiretap for the first time
>>> ever in *2012* (or so we're told, for non-intelligence domestic US
>>> wiretaps), and has only ever worked five times."
>>> 
>>> What are you referring to? Do you have a pointer to more
>>> information? I am very curious.
>> 
>> http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/WiretapReports/wiretap-report-2012.aspx#sa5
>> 
>> E.
>> 
>> - --
>> Ideas are my favorite toys.
>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
>> Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32)
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>> iF4EAREIAAYFAlHObssACgkQQwkE2RkM0wpJvgD9FMiYpwatSomo+sCOr2JQxPnU
>> nUC3+yZzHJ1Uyh1+23gA/0tijTIRQnh5kZzIP9Fw6uUm9JiweuRXSv4mHhhPC/Gq
>> =Lw8s
>> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
> --
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--
Alireza Mahdian
Department of Computer Science
University of Colorado at Boulder
Email: alireza.mahdian at gmail.com

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