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[liberationtech] US wiretap statistics (was re: a privacy preserving and resilient social network)

Ali-Reza Anghaie ali at packetknife.com
Fri Jun 28 23:26:10 PDT 2013


On Sat, Jun 29, 2013 at 1:52 AM, Alireza Mahdian
<alireza.mahdian at gmail.com> wrote:
> I really hope all your other facts are not based on this link you sent. as
> Matt rightfully put it we don't know the kind of cipher that was used it
> could have been a  very primitive one. you are making a very bold statement
> based on a very incomplete data. it is as if you are claiming that if one

Actually the link and data do not say - nor was it her assertion -
that they attacked the crypto itself. And that goes back to the whole
of her original response (which was a broader call to arms /
perspective). Many are often missing the broader picture on how these
systems are attacked by capable bodies and Governments if that is,
indeed, one of the adversary bodies you've identified.

> pointed out that it does not even aim for it. As the creator of MyZone I did
> not felt the need for unlinkability as deniability is provided to a needed
> degree. You probably are not going to give my app even a try but I would
> certainly give your "Bullet proof" solution if it ever sees the light of the
> day a try and read its documentation in full before criticizing it. I have

I think you're jumping to conclusions much the same way you suggest
any question to you is. Your first response to any input was "this is
to prevent modifications that would render it as a malware" in regards
to the Open Source aspect. Which makes no sense - at all. It's not
even defensible. You could include a license with your codebase that
has nothing to do with the offered service as-is.

So take a step back and, seriously, ask yourself did you want input or
did you just want praise?

> tried SO MANY of these solutions that you mentioned in a very restrictive
> environment (I come from Iran and I have first hand experience on whatever
> you are mentioning here) and trust me they are often so slow (you have to
> consider dial up bandwidth) that you prefer to avoid them in the first
> place. I will consider any "constructive" criticism of my work and
> appreciate it very much but telling me that I have solved the "wrong"
> problem is just your opinion. I certainly wouldn't consider my self such
> expert enough in the field to make a blunt statement like that towards
> anybody's work. I will not respond to any of your comments from this point
> on until I see reasonable signs that you have read my thesis and at the very
> least understand my design choices. I owe you a thank you for the time you
> have put to write those emails regarding my work.

Wait - are you telling someone not to make such bold statements while
making.. wait for it.. a number of your own?

Also - as an Iranian transplant with continued involvement I'm not at
all sure you can relate those circumstances as comprehensive to the
rest of the world. Actually - I'd say you flat-out can't. It's not
even that homogenous within Iran anymore.

Usability is a BIG debate point on the list - often - with some of us
(myself included) feeling that falling within a broken system and
being covered by regular "noise" is often better than an unusable
system.

However - going back to what you started with - you asserted a context
within current events and against Government. That has a big weighty
goal attached to it and raises hackles.

So let's all start over.

Hello Alireza. I'm.. err. Ali-Reza. Congratulations on your recent
Doctorate and welcome to Libtech.

Cheers, -Ali


>
> On Jun 28, 2013, at 11:28 PM, Matt Johnson <railmeat at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Well that is good news, thanks for the pointer!
>
> Now all we need is for the court to report what cipher and which
> encryption tools were used...
>
> --
> Matt Johnson
>
>
>
> On Fri, Jun 28, 2013 at 10:21 PM, Eleanor Saitta <ella at dymaxion.org> wrote:
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA256
>
> On 2013.06.29 01.18, Matt Johnson wrote:
>
> " Encryption meaningfully prevented a wiretap for the first time
> ever in *2012* (or so we're told, for non-intelligence domestic US
> wiretaps), and has only ever worked five times."
>
> What are you referring to? Do you have a pointer to more
> information? I am very curious.
>
>
> http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/WiretapReports/wiretap-report-2012.aspx#sa5
>
> E.
>
> - --
> Ideas are my favorite toys.
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> nUC3+yZzHJ1Uyh1+23gA/0tijTIRQnh5kZzIP9Fw6uUm9JiweuRXSv4mHhhPC/Gq
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>
> --
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>
>
> --
> Alireza Mahdian
> Department of Computer Science
> University of Colorado at Boulder
> Email: alireza.mahdian at gmail.com
>
>
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