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[liberationtech] Tor Exit Nodes Mapped and Located | HackerTarget.com

George K. kargig.lists at gmail.com
Mon Mar 11 00:57:16 PDT 2013


Yet another map of Tor nodes (updated every hour): https://tormap.void.gr/

code is here: https://github.com/kargig/tormap
and is based on: https://github.com/moba/tormap


On Mon, Mar 11, 2013 at 3:29 AM, Ali-Reza Anghaie <ali at packetknife.com>wrote:

> Jacob also shared his map tool (updated every 5m):
>
> http://freehaven.net/~ioerror/maps/v3-tormap.html
>
> -Ali
>
>
>
> On Sun, Mar 10, 2013 at 9:23 PM, <liberationtech at lewman.us> wrote:
>
>> On Sun, 10 Mar 2013 11:32:20 -0700
>> Yosem Companys <companys at stanford.edu> wrote:
>>
>> > http://hackertarget.com/tor-exit-node-visualization/
>> >
>> > Tor Exit Nodes Located and Mapped
>>
>> Tor includes a Network Map which also maps nodes across a Mercator
>> projection of the globe. I don't understand this fetish with Google
>> mapping everything (why not openstreetmap? why not doing lat/long
>> coordinate mapping on your own map?). However, it apparently exists. Ok,
>> moving on.
>>
>> The usage of blutmagie is an interesting choice, when
>> https://metrics.torproject.org/ and https://compass.torproject.org/ and
>> https://atlas.torproject.org/ all exist with gobs more data, including
>> the raw source data on which all of those sites are built. Freegeoip.net
>> uses the same MaxMind GeoList database we do. Google has it's own GeoIP
>> database as well. I wonder which one is most accurate.
>>
>> What's more valuable to me is the list of exit relays by ISP.
>> Intuitively, it makes sense. Cheap, well-connected server providers are
>> going to be attractive to those running Tor relays (exits or not). I
>> take this list to mean, "this is the list of ISPs who care about
>> Internet freedom". It sure seems small.
>>
>> The other implication here is that Tor exits can be monitored. Yes, we
>> know. We've been saying this for a decade. Here's one blog post about
>> it, https://blog.torproject.org/blog/plaintext-over-tor-still-plaintext.
>> It's part of the reason the EFF and Tor write HTTPS Everywhere for
>> Chrome and Firefox, https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere.
>>
>> Your ISP can watch your traffic too, and inject ads or redirect DNS. In
>> fact, there's a billion dollar market for traffic management at ISPs.
>> I'm assuming this means the providers are looking to manage Tor traffic
>> as well.
>>
>> For me, the visualization is a cool map, a product pitch for
>> hackertarget llc, and just raises some implications for operational
>> security.
>>
>> Larger questions it raises in my mind are about AS-aware routing,
>> what does it mean to have a large concentration of exit relays in
>> pro-freedom ISPs, and what about legal jurisdictions and MLATs?
>>
>> There is some on-going work on the AS-awareness question, see
>> http://freehaven.net/anonbib/bibtex.html#DBLP:conf:ccs:EdmanS09 and
>> http://freehaven.net/anonbib/bibtex.html#oakland2012-lastor and
>> http://freehaven.net/anonbib/bibtex.html#ndss13-lira
>>
>> As for some measurement of anonymity and risk modulo concentration of
>> exit relays? Who knows. Sounds like a fine project.
>>
>> And I know of at least one group working on the MLAT and legal
>> arbitrage question as it relates to tor circuits and relays.
>>
>> I look forward to more analysis and proposed research theories to
>> improve the Tor network in the future.
>>
>> --
>> Andrew
>> http://tpo.is/contact
>> pgp 0x6B4D6475
>> --
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>
>
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-- 
Καργιωτάκης Γιώργος
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