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[liberationtech] Ubuntu Privacy Remix remix?

Matt Johnson railmeat at gmail.com
Wed Nov 6 13:21:20 PST 2013


Sorry Eugen, I am still not getting it. You will author content in
isolation, without reference to any information at all? Or perhaps in
a library with books on paper? When I author something I constantly
refer to other material.

Lets say you write something, then burn it to CD and transfer it to a
networked system and send it out. Isn't it now subject to traffic
analysis and perhaps malware injection? It is only secure if you
author it and never move it from the air gaped computer.

If you take Griffin's point that connecting a USB stick, or external
hard drive is dangerous, and that PDFs are dangerous then I don't
think you can do much with that air gaped computer. I am asking a
serious question, what are realistic use cases for an air gaped
computer?

Thanks
-- Matt Johnson

On Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 12:32 PM, Eugen Leitl <eugen at leitl.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 06, 2013 at 10:54:34AM -0800, Matt Johnson wrote:
>> I fail grasp the utility of such and offline computer. If you keep a
>
> You must have nothing to hide, then. Some of us do.
>
>> computer air gaped as you describe you will not be able to do much
>> with it.
>
> Gee, how about authoring content, and encrypting it, and
> transferring it via sneakernet to your insecure system.
> That way untrusted network doesn't start at your router,
> but at your main machine.
>
>> What do you want the air gaped computer for?
>
> Gee, this is exactly the kind of questions which
> TLAs would love to have answered. But no longer
> can exfiltrate stealthily. That alone should give
> you sufficient reason to pay for an air-gapped
> computer.
> --
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