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[liberationtech] Asyncronous secure messaging (Email): Why reinvent the wheel?

d.nix d.nix at comcast.net
Sat Nov 9 13:40:33 PST 2013


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Why should I continue to trust the very standards and systems that
were subverted, corrupted, or just plain sold me out for a profit?
Standards and organizations that enshrined & codified confusing,
weakened, and watered down systems and made privacy damn near
impossible. The endless bickering and back room dealings to keep
government contracts, security agency moles and corporate shills fat
and wealthy and all data trackable - THAT IS STILL GOING ON. Just
follow any IETF discussion group. Screw that.

It deserves to die an agonizing and expensive death. Kill the beast.

I love email, and use it daily, yet I would personally plunge the
sword in and gut it myself to make room for something completely new,
away from prying eyes and content/traffic analysis.

I choose to support and reward the innovators and free thinkers that
refuse to color inside the lines. The p2p, decentralized, distributed,
meshnet, anon remailer, onion routing, Tor hidden service, Whonix,
high latency, low traffic correlation, Bitmessage, steganographic
hidden covert channel developers.

Everything else is just kicking the can down the road, and furthermore
is enabling the fascist panopticon surveillance state.

DN

Bitmessage: BM-2DA3ob7GXkVF1yFEnCwSGXtWT3Hqqu1haJ

- --


On 11/9/2013 9:25 AM, Edwin Chu wrote:
> Why is it better to limit our innovation to the existing standards
> when creating the nonexistent secure messaging system? Sometimes we
> could improve security of a system by adding layers to it, like
> HTTPS and ZRTP; sometimes hacking on a legacy protocol isn't good
> enough and we create new things. After all, even we just add a new
> layer to existing standards, we are creating new standards. While
> resemblance to existing protocol may boost software adoption, I
> don't see it is wrong to design a new protocol (having it based on
> existing one or not) and then make it a de facto/official
> standard.
> 
> Edwin
> 
> 
> On Sat, Nov 9, 2013 at 12:56 AM, M. Fioretti
> <mfioretti at nexaima.net> wrote:
> 
>> On Sat, Nov 09, 2013 09:37:27 AM +0100, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
>> wrote:
>> 
>>> All initiatiatives are trying to setup some new technological 
>>> infrastructure, some new communication or encryption protocol.
>>> 
>>> We MUST USE THE INTERNET STANDARDS, with modifications here and
>>> there, improving them, in order to reach our goal in securing
>>> asyncronous communications methods commonly referred as
>>> "Email".
>>> 
>>> While i appreciate all of those cryptographer trying to do
>>> something new, i must say that THIS IS THE WRONG WAY!
>>> 
>> 
>> +100 :-) THANKS Fabio!
>> 
>> Agree word by word with the whole message! -- Liberationtech is
>> public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list
>> guidelines will get you moderated: 
>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. 
>> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing
>> moderator at companys at stanford.edu.
>> 
> 
> 
> 
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