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[liberationtech] Google Unveils Tools to Access Web From Repressive Countries |

Dan Staples danstaples at
Mon Oct 21 15:38:42 PDT 2013

And keep in mind, the uProxy project doesn't seem to be trying to
provide anonymity, only uncensored internet access. There are many
challenges to anonymity that a simple browser plugin can't solve.
Browsers are extremely easy to fingerprint, which is why Tor is now
being packaged as an entire browser bundle.

What I'm most curious about is how much information about the users of
uProxy will be collected and analyzed by Google and shared with its


On 10/21/2013 06:09 PM, Sacha van Geffen wrote:
> On 21-10-13 22:49, Nick wrote:
>> Despite the provenence of the story, I'm still suprised there was no 
>> mention of Google's cooperation with repressive elements of its own 
>> government through PRISM and the like. Or (though this is probably 
>> far too optimistic) a mention of whether surveillance as overarching 
>> paradigm is compatible with the sort of self-representation they 
>> offer here.
> google is a many headed dragon, like the US government, with one head
> canceling out some actions of others. It is a shame that those heads are
> not all the same size (like DoD vs State). Still I would encourage the
> small heads to go on and do their work.
>> I also wonder how anonymous it is for the relay side - whether it's 
>> really just an interface to Tor bridge nodes, and therefore the 
>> relay can't see everything their "friend" is up to, or if it's a 
>> straight proxy. I would guess the latter as their emphasis seems to 
>> be completely about helping people hop out of their country's 
>> repressive internet policies.
> Seeing the description and the involvement of brave new software I
> assume it is related to or a rename of Lantern, lantern is a proxy
> software that uses the google social graph to find access. Maybe someone
> from BNS could elaborate
> In terms of threat model it would be reasonable to trust the 'friend' in
> this scenario, I would be more concerned with adversary externaly
> observing the connections, seeing that a group of people from within
> country X are connecting to the same ip in country Y , thus relating
> those people in that group as sharing a node in a social graph, so to
> eachother, while they might not have seen them as related before..
> Cheers, Sacha

Dan Staples

Open Technology Institute
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