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[liberationtech] uVirtus Linux, encrypted OS for Syria

Michael Rogers michael at briarproject.org
Fri Sep 27 11:16:39 PDT 2013


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On 27/09/13 15:23, Lorenzo Franceschi -Bicchierai wrote:
> Thoughts?

The update feature of uVirtus's Sanctuary VPN (OpenVPN obfuscated with
obfsproxy) is a bit concerning. The source code has been removed from
Github, but judging by the description on the uVirtus site, the client
downloads an encrypted list of proxies from an update server. The list
is encrypted with a key that's baked into the client. No integrity
protection is mentioned.

(The choice of encryption algorithm is odd - "Password Based
Encryption with MD5 and Triple DES". Perhaps that's for compatibility
with very old export-restricted versions of Java?)

As far as I can tell (again, going by the description on the site),
someone with access to a copy of the client could extract the
encryption key and forge a list of proxies. The forged list could then
be substituted for the real list by intercepting connections to the
update server, causing other clients to connect to proxies controlled
by the attacker.

Cheers,
Michael

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