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[liberationtech] mod_require_otr in prosody

Eleanor Saitta ella at
Sat Feb 1 04:16:34 PST 2014

Hash: SHA256

On 2014.01.31 15.49, Nicolás Reynolds wrote:
> i suggested the idea of otr requirement to prosody devs :)


> Re: [prosody-users] mod_require_otr?.eml Subject: Re:
> [prosody-users] mod_require_otr? From: Matthew Wild
> <mwild1 at> Date: 2014.01.31 15.31 To: Prosody IM Users
> Group <prosody-users at>
> Another concern might be that it encourages users to use OTR
> without authenticating their contacts properly.

Just a short note here -- we'd still prefer that people use OTR even
without authentication, as it turns a passive attack (assuming
server/SSL key compromise) into an active one.  Yes, users need to
understand what the risks are, but in the vast majority of outcomes,
they'll be better off.

Currently, many clients only support a single, heavyweight trust
declaration for fingerprints and will not warn you when a fingerprint
changes if you haven't verified it.  If clients notified on every
fingerprint change, it would be *much* easier to detect periodic
active attacks even without verification.  Likewise, they mostly only
support a single fingerprint per user, which vastly complicates use
with multiple (mobile/desktop, for instance) clients.  In all cases
I've seen, actual fingerprint management (outside of verification) is
poor to nonexistent.  All of these are areas we should consider
improvement in.


- -- 
Ideas are my favorite toys.
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