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[liberationtech] Many VPNs and Psiphon are currently blocked in Iran right now

Brian Conley brianc at smallworldnews.tv
Sat Feb 22 16:49:07 PST 2014


Thanks Collin, my only point is that Tor *does work* inside Iran unless you
can dispute those numbers.

The only way we can build solutions is with hard evidence not anecdotes
about things being slow or as others have bandied about users being only
interested in speed or convenience.

Clearly Tor does not have the kind of user adoption that Psiphon has, no
one is disputing that.

Effective and responsible social change takes patience and organizing.
We've already seen the effects of this absence in Egypt. We also saw it 35
years ago in Iran and are still  experiencing it.

Social change takes time and effective organizing. I don't care what the
tools are in simply asking for more collaboration and data.
On Feb 22, 2014 12:42 PM, "Collin Anderson" <collin at averysmallbird.com>
wrote:

>
> On Sat, Feb 22, 2014 at 2:58 PM, Brian Conley <brianc at smallworldnews.tv>wrote:
>
>> Sure, and for 25,000 users apparently Tor works at least some of the
>> time. We need to understand why tor(and other products) work for these
>> individuals & why it doesn't work for others. This is the only way we can
>> effectively educate folks and adapt to such constantly changing
>> circumstances.
>>
>>
> There are 76.42 million people in Iran, half of whom have some Internet
> access and within that subset at least a quarter circumvent the filtering,
> by the estimation of the Iranian police chief. That *certainly shady* math
> implies that the current number of Tor users is something like less than
> .3% of filter-circumventing users, a fraction of Psiphon's claims of 3
> million unique users a week [1]. While I naturally agree with Nima, this
> will not necessarily scale for long because the government has shown an
> ability and willingness to shut down unknown traffic streams or suspect SSL
> connections. It's my understanding that the TCI is now aware of how to
> disrupt Tor again, but is likely sitting the attack on or still testing it
> on a small scale.
>
> [1] https://asl19.org/cctr/research/
> --
> *Collin David Anderson*
> averysmallbird.com | @cda | Washington, D.C.
>
> --
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