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[liberationtech] Cryptography Leak in Enigmail / GnuPG
taltman1 at stanford.edu
Mon Jun 2 14:48:26 PDT 2014
Thank you for your reply, Fabio. I read the example scenario in that link you provided.
To play devil's advocate, what stops the adversary from testing all available PGP-related vulnerabilities against their targets of interest? In other words, just how much more expensive have you made targeted operations? Or how much more expensive have you made bulk surveillance? It's not clear that this makes it drastically more difficult / costly.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)" <lists at infosecurity.ch>
To: liberationtech at lists.stanford.edu
Sent: Monday, June 2, 2014 2:06:16 PM
Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Cryptography Leak in Enigmail / GnuPG
Il 6/2/14, 6:43 PM, Tomer Altman ha scritto:
> Can you state precisely the threat model that you are concerned about?
You are right, the subject is not directly related to "cryptography" but
to "security" .
The threat model is better described in the ticket that has been opened
to various PGP email client's plugin such as
With the fixes that has been done in GnuPG, Enigmail and GPGTool, such
software should provide safe default against this issue.
It has been also reported that Symantec Encryption Desktop (formerly PGP
Desktop) add multiple fingerprint to header leading to information
leak. An issue ticket has been opened also for such commercial product.
The commercial PGP software add the following headers, at least not
adding the exact version number:
Received: from XXXXXXX
by XXXX-YYYYY (PGP Universal service);
Sun, XX XXX 20XX 11:11:11 +0100
by XX-XXXXX on Sun, XX XXX 20XX 11:11:11 +0100
Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)
HERMES - Center for Transparency and Digital Human Rights
http://logioshermes.org - http://globaleaks.org - http://tor2web.org
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