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[liberationtech] TrueCrypt Alternatives?
jancsika at yahoo.com
Mon Oct 6 10:35:05 PDT 2014
Hi Bill,Just keep in mind that there hasn't been a single citation of any reliable research or human rights reports about deniability in this thread. So if you are looking for advice specifically on whether the system should even include deniability, you're basically working off an opinion of a researcher based on accounts she heard but cannot repeat to you.
On Monday, October 6, 2014 12:56 PM, Eleanor Saitta <ella at dymaxion.org> wrote:
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On 2014.10.06 01.56, Bill Cox wrote:
> I will have an impact on the code going forward. Also, I am
> entirely a pragmatist. I am an engineer, not a cryptographer, and
> I build stuff that works in the real world. Can you explain a
> deniable crypto-system that fits the real world?
It's unclear that there is one. I'd feel far happier recommending a
(new, continued development, audited, etc.) version of Truecrypt with
no deniability features at all. Using the features in such a way that
you don't leave traces of the container has always been really, really
difficult -- if you read the docs page on what's required to evade
forensic detection, it should be pretty clear how unsuitable this
feature is for regular users. Yes, some of those might be removable
with significant developer effort, but I'm not sure why that's worth
it, given the larger issues.
> I think we who are trying to keep TrueCrypt alive could use your
Happy to chat more.
Ideas are my favorite toys.
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