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[liberationtech] TrueCrypt Alternatives?

Jonathan Wilkes jancsika at yahoo.com
Mon Oct 6 10:39:19 PDT 2014


And just to keep the discussion on topic-- I'm talking about research or reports on the benefits/drawbacks of using software in the field that has some deniability features.
-Jonathan 

     On Monday, October 6, 2014 12:56 PM, Eleanor Saitta <ella at dymaxion.org> wrote:
   

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On 2014.10.06 01.56, Bill Cox wrote:
> I will have an impact on the code going forward.  Also, I am
> entirely a pragmatist.  I am an engineer, not a cryptographer, and
> I build stuff that works in the real world.  Can you explain a
> deniable crypto-system that fits the real world?

It's unclear that there is one.  I'd feel far happier recommending a
(new, continued development, audited, etc.) version of Truecrypt with
no deniability features at all.  Using the features in such a way that
you don't leave traces of the container has always been really, really
difficult -- if you read the docs page on what's required to evade
forensic detection, it should be pretty clear how unsuitable this
feature is for regular users.  Yes, some of those might be removable
with significant developer effort, but I'm not sure why that's worth
it, given the larger issues.

> I think we who are trying to keep TrueCrypt alive could use your
> advice.

Happy to chat more.

E.

- -- 
Ideas are my favorite toys.
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