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[liberationtech] Tool so people might stop doing crazy things with their bitcoins (and stop being robbed)
ycompanys at gmail.com
Sun Jan 28 10:24:44 PST 2018
I'm no longer a list moderator, but I can't help but intervene here. All of
you have been and continue to be great contributors to the larger
liberationtech community. A longstanding participant has created something
to try to advance the public good. There may be differences in terms of how
to do it. But we can all speak amicably about the issues.
On Sun, Jan 28, 2018 at 10:16 AM, Aymeric Vitte <vitteaymeric at gmail.com>
> Sorry I don't get a single thing in your answer, apparently you don't
> know what you are talking about (and please keep your statements for
> yourself, like "knowledgeable enough" and auditing the bitcoin core code)
> It's quite easy to check what the module is doing, this is "just"
> implementing the bitcoin protocol, which works for quasi all of existing
> coins, there are no crypto inventions/tricks, and such tool does not
> exist then there is a real added value
> Probably you don't know very well the bitcoin world and the current
> mess, please read everything again and we could discuss, and indeed I
> really care that people don't make mistakes with this module
> And see https://github.com/Ayms/bitcoin-wallets or
> https://github.com/Ayms/zcash-wallets or
> https://github.com/Ayms/cashaddress , those ones are not trivial at all
> also and completely open source, and btw can be combined with the module
> of course as explained, should people read things, consider reading the
> "not coming from nowhere" link too and linked issues on BTG github rep
> where people commented
> See the git history of the README for your last question
> Le 28/01/2018 à 16:53, Thomas Delrue a écrit :
> > On 01/28/2018 06:22 AM, Aymeric Vitte wrote:
> >> People don't estimate the effort to do such tool, which is not
> >> trivial at all given the over complexification of bitcoin stuff, and
> >> are trying to cheat modifying the code to remove the fees (which is a
> >> bit crazy for such a module and could just result for them to send
> >> their coins to some wrong places or have them locked somewhere)
> > And so your solution is not to prevent the 'cheating' but instead to
> > hide it, wave your hands and say "these are not the droids you are
> > looking for, move along"?
> > If that is the case, I have a hard time understanding what your
> > value-add is, because your solution has a hard-embedded way to cheat,
> > that is fundamental to its operation.
> > Security through obscurity only works for an ever diminishing time.
> >> I think it's useless to restart an "open source vs not open source"
> >> discussion, open source does not mean secure and easy to audit (try
> >> for example to audit the bitcoin core source code and all
> >> dependencies), the only thing that matters is that the code is
> >> provided and can be checked, which is the case
> > It is most certainly *not* useless to restart this discussion because
> > people still don't "get it". People need to be told about it over and
> > over again as demonstrated again right here.
> > The fact that neither you nor I are knowledgeable enough to be auditing
> > the BitCoin core source code is not important; what is more important is
> > that someone who /is/ capable, has the ability, means and access to do
> > so: light works as a disinfectant and your choice to hide from the light
> > speaks for itself.
> > Sadly, you also chose to keep something related to crypto (generation of
> > hashes) in an inaccessible state. If anything, this is the part that
> > should be made most easy to audit to those with expertise in that area
> > since it is the thing that will provide 'trust' to your system. Since
> > you're dealing with money, I'm pretty convinced that it is incredibly
> > important to you that people trust your implementation.
> > Keeping a part, crucial to said trust, inaccessible is a big red flag to
> > me because chances are, you're rolling your own crypto/hashing. And as
> > we all (should) know: unless you are or have a team cryptographers that
> > do this for a living, rolling your own encryption will result in
> > If you're not rolling your own and are using a standard, then why not
> > make that easy to figure out and audit?
> > Are you or do you employ one or more cryptographers?
> >> In the first versions we stated something like "Should this project
> >> be funded we will remove the dev fees and it will become fully open
> >> source"
> > Where exactly is this stated? I can't find it if I search your github
> > spot for the term "source":
> > https://github.com/Ayms/bitcoin-transactions/search?q=source
> Bitcoin transactions made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/
> Zcash wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/zcash-wallets
> Bitcoin wallets made simple: https://github.com/Ayms/bitcoin-wallets
> Get the torrent dynamic blocklist: http://peersm.com/getblocklist
> Check the 10 M passwords list: http://peersm.com/findmyass
> Anti-spies and private torrents, dynamic blocklist:
> Peersm : http://www.peersm.com
> torrent-live: https://github.com/Ayms/torrent-live
> node-Tor : https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor
> GitHub : https://www.github.com/Ayms
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