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[theory-seminar] Talk Today at 4:30pm: Ron Lavi
ofirgeri at stanford.edu
Thu May 16 09:23:06 PDT 2019
Ron Lavi is a giving a talk today that may be of interest to some of you (see details below).
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Speaker: Ron Lavi
Location: Spilker 317
Time: Thursday March 16th, at 4:30
Title: Contests for Revenue Share
Abstract: In a framework of contest design, we study capacity-constrained competition and analyze its resulting revenue shares. Our analysis contrasts the near-symmetric case, where firms have similar supply sizes, and the extremely asymmetric case, where one large firm dominates the market. In particular, we show that while in the near-symmetric case simple contests provide near optimal equilibrium revenues for all sellers, in the asymmetric case a large firm can design more complicated contests that result in disproportionally low equilibrium revenues for her smaller opponents.
This is joint work with Uriel Feige and Moshe Tennenholtz.
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